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ABSTRACT

RISK-RETURN TRADEOFFS AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
David Tsui
Wayne Guay
Moral hazard theory posits that managerial risk aversion imposes agency costs on shareholders,
and firms respond by providing risk-taking incentives to mitigate these costs. The underlying
assumption in this literature is that increasing shareholder value requires increasing risk, yet there
is limited empirical evidence supporting this assumption or the role of such risk-return tradeoffs in
incentive compensation design. Using measures based on the firm’s stock price, I find that
shareholder value increases with risk, consistent with managerial risk aversion imposing agency
costs on shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with more risk-taking incentives when
this risk-return relation is more positive and thus potential risk-related agency costs are more
severe. This finding is strongest among firms where value increases with idiosyncratic rather than
systematic risk, consistent with theory that these agency costs arise primarily from managers’
exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Overall, these results are consistent with firms designing managerial
compensation contracts to mitigate risk-related agency costs. Additional findings highlight that the
incentives from equity-based compensation depend on the risk-return tradeoffs that managers
face, providing one explanation for the conflicting results in prior literature regarding the incentives
from managerial stock price exposure.
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1. Introduction
The moral hazard literature argues that managerial risk aversion introduces agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders and, as a result, shareholders may provide risktaking incentives to reduce the costs of these conflicts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith
and Stulz, 1985). Throughout this literature, the underlying assumption is that managers may avoid
certain investment-related risks and thereby reduce shareholder value (i.e., increasing the value of
investment projects requires increasing risk and thus managerial risk aversion may diminish
shareholder value). However, there is limited empirical evidence supporting this assumption or,
more importantly, examining how this relation between risk and shareholder value influences
incentive compensation design. In particular, there is little evidence regarding whether firms appear
to provide risk-taking incentives to help manage agency costs of managerial risk aversion, or if
managerial incentive compensation may instead motivate “excessive” (i.e., value-destroying) risktaking to the potential detriment of shareholders, as several studies suggest (e.g., Lambert, 1986;
Dong, Wang, and Xie, 2010; Athanasakou, Ferreira, and Goh, 2013). 1 In this paper, I address these
issues through two primary analyses. First, I estimate the relation between risk-taking and firm
value by evaluating whether greater investment risk is associated with greater increases in firm
value from these investments. Second, I examine how this risk-return relation2 influences
managers’ compensation contracts. Specifically, I test whether firms provide more risk-taking
incentives when potential agency costs stemming from managerial risk aversion are greater.
Managers’ risk aversion may impose agency costs on shareholders for a number of
reasons.3 First, managers might forgo value-increasing projects (from outside shareholders’

1

This concern about excessive risk-taking is also widespread among the popular press and regulators. See,
for example, “U.S. Regulators Revive Work on Incentive Pay Rules; Compensation That Rewards Excessive
Risk Taking Is a Concern,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2015.
2 Throughout the paper, I use the terms “risk-return tradeoffs” and “risk-return relations” interchangeably to
refer to the relation between risk and firm value (i.e., whether firm value increases with risk). This is distinct
from the relation between risk and required return (i.e., whether discount rates increase with risk). These two
ideas are not necessarily inconsistent because if expected cash flows increase with risk, firm value may also
increase despite an increase in discount rates.
3 In particular, risk aversion may create agency costs if managers are more risk averse than shareholders
(e.g., if managers are averse to idiosyncratic risk while shareholders are indifferent). I discuss managerial risk
aversion in more detail in Section 2.
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perspective) that they deem too risky, even if shareholders view the risk as acceptable. For
example, managers are often poorly diversified and therefore unable to eliminate their exposure to
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and
Stulz, 1985). As a result, they may impose higher discount rates than well-diversified shareholders
when evaluating investment opportunities, potentially causing them to reject value-increasing
projects that carry significant amounts of idiosyncratic risk. Second, for a given level of investment,
managers may reallocate investment away from riskier projects, even if these riskier projects
generate greater returns. For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) argue that managers
with fewer risk-taking incentives shift investment toward lower-risk projects. If these less risky
investments tend to generate smaller returns, this shift may be detrimental to shareholders. Third,
managers may choose to enter the firm into costly hedging contracts (Smith and Stulz, 1985) or
engage in diversifying acquisitions (Amihud and Lev, 1981), which prior literature argues reduce
both firm risk and value (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). In summary, riskrelated agency costs4 stem from managers avoiding certain projects that increase both shareholder
value and risk (or, similarly, from managers investing in projects that decrease both shareholder
value and risk). That is, the basic assumption in this literature is that there exists a positive relation
between risk and shareholder value and, given this assumption, potential agency costs arise
because risk-averse managers have incentives to choose a level of risk (and therefore value) that
is “too low” from shareholders’ perspective.
In response to these potential risk-related agency costs, shareholders may choose to
provide managers with risk-taking incentives. Much of the prior literature focuses on convex
compensation contracts (e.g., stock options) as a mechanism to reduce managerial risk aversion
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 5 These

4

More precisely, agency costs that arise from managers being more risk-averse than shareholders. I use the
term “risk-related agency costs” in this paper to refer to these costs of managerial risk aversion (and not, for
example, any potential costs from managers being overly risk-tolerant from shareholders’ perspective).
5 If shareholder value and risk are positively related, linear contracts on stock price (e.g., restricted stock) may
also provide risk-taking incentives. However, these linear contracts are likely to be less effective than convex
contracts at motivating risk-taking because they also increase managers’ sensitivity to negative outcomes and

2

contracts reward managers more for increases in firm value of a given magnitude than they
penalize managers for decreases in firm value of the same magnitude. As a result, managers’
expected payoffs from these contracts increase as risk increases, potentially increasing their
appetite for risk. Consistent with this reasoning, empirical studies examining equity-based
compensation and risk-taking generally find that managers respond to convex compensation
contracts by taking greater risk and therefore conclude that these types of contracts help reduce
managerial risk aversion (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low,
2009).
The objective of this paper is to examine the risk-return tradeoffs that managers face when
making investment decisions and how these tradeoffs influence firms’ incentive compensation
choices. In particular, I argue that the potential costs of managerial risk aversion are larger when
the relation between risk and shareholder value is more positive. As a result, I expect that firms
should provide more managerial risk-taking incentives as this relation becomes stronger. For
example, if the riskiest investments earn twice the returns of the least risky investments at one firm
while at another firm the difference in returns is insignificant, I expect the first firm to provide more
risk-taking incentives.
I conduct my analysis in two stages. First, I estimate the investment risk-return tradeoffs
that firms face by examining contemporaneous changes in equity value and stock volatility for firms
with large amounts of new investment. I find that, on average, the value of investment projects
increases with risk, both in total and per dollar of investment. That is, firms that make riskier
investments experience greater increases in value than those who make lower-risk investments.
This is consistent with managerial risk aversion potentially imposing agency costs on shareholders
and inconsistent with widespread excessive risk-taking.
Second, I test how the strength of this risk-return relation influences firms’ incentive
compensation decisions. Consistent with firms considering these “returns on risk” when designing

are more costly to implement (see, e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert and Larcker, 2004).
I discuss this issue in more detail in Sections 2 and 5.
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their incentive compensation, I find that firms provide their managers with more convex
compensation contracts as the relation between risk and equity value becomes more positive.
Furthermore, this association between compensation convexity and risk-return tradeoffs is
concentrated at firms where payoffs to investment increase in idiosyncratic (rather than systematic)
risk, consistent with predictions from agency theory that risk-related agency costs primarily stem
from managerial aversion to idiosyncratic risks (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz,
1985). I also find that firms tend to use less convex incentive compensation (i.e., compensation
that is more linear in firm value) when the returns to lower-risk investment are higher. Overall, these
results are consistent with firms providing risk-taking incentives to help mitigate potential riskrelated agency costs.
I also consider how risk-return tradeoffs may directly influence managers’ risk-taking
incentives, independent of any effect on firms’ incentive compensation decisions. In particular,
managers may benefit from increasing their firm’s cash flows for reasons unrelated to
compensation or ownership stake in the firm. For example, greater cash flows may allow managers
to more easily increase the size of the firm or invest in pet projects (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Thus,
managers may have greater incentives to take on risk when the payoffs to riskier investment are
larger, independent of the incentives provided by their compensation contract. Additionally, riskreturn relations may also influence how managers respond to a given compensation contract. In
particular, if increased risk-taking increases the value of the firm, equity-based compensation
potentially provides managers with two incentives for greater risk-taking: a “direct” effect, from
greater risk increasing the value of the manager’s option portfolio independent of any effect of this
greater risk on firm value, and an “indirect” effect, from greater risk increasing firm value, which in
turn increases the value of the manager’s stock and option holdings. 6 The option portfolio vega

The total change in a manager’s wealth from increasing risk (i.e., “risk-taking incentives”) can be expressed
as the sum of the partial derivative of wealth with respect to risk and the derivative of firm value with respect
to risk times the partial derivative of wealth with respect to firm value:
6

𝑑𝑊 𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝑊 𝑑𝑉
=
+
𝑑𝜎
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝑉 𝑑𝜎
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measure commonly used in the prior literature (i.e., the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to a one
percentage point increase in stock volatility) captures this “direct” effect but omits any “indirect”
effect. The “indirect” effect is related to the manager’s portfolio delta (i.e., the sensitivity of the
manager’s wealth to a one percent increase in stock price) and is increasing in the strength of the
relation between risk and return, suggesting that delta may provide more risk-taking incentives for
managers when risk-return relations are stronger (i.e., more positive). Consistent with both these
hypotheses, I find that stronger risk-return tradeoffs appear to increase both managers’ appetite for
risk-taking, independent of incentives from their compensation contracts, and the risk-taking
incentives provided by managers’ delta.
I make several contributions to the literature. I find that, on average, there is a positive
relation between the risk of and return on firms’ investments. I also find evidence that riskier projects
(per dollar of investment) tend to generate greater returns, suggesting that risk-related agency
costs may result not only from firms investing in “too few” projects (i.e., underinvesting) but also
investing in projects that are “too safe”. These results highlight that risk-taking is an integral
component of making investments that increase shareholder value, consistent with assumptions in
the prior moral hazard literature (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985) and in
contrast to more recent notions of excessive risk-taking and concerns regarding increased risktaking largely harming shareholders.
Next, I show that firms behave as if they consider risk-return tradeoffs when designing their
incentive compensation structures. In particular, I find that firms provide managers with more risktaking incentives when the potential costs of managerial risk aversion are greater. While the
existing literature provides extensive evidence regarding the effectiveness of convex compensation
contracts in promoting managerial risk-taking, there is limited evidence as to whether firms seem
to provide such contracts with the intent of motivating risk-taking, or if this is perhaps an unintended

where 𝑊 is the manager’s wealth, 𝜎 is the firm’s risk, and 𝑉 is the firm’s value. The first term on the right-hand
side is the “direct” effect and the second term is the “indirect” effect.
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consequence of these compensation contracts. 7 I provide evidence that firms do appear to manage
potential risk-related agency costs through their choice of incentive compensation contracts.
My findings highlight that understanding the incentive consequences of managerial equitybased compensation requires considering not only the magnitude and shape of the payoff structure
(i.e., delta and vega) but also the relation between risk and shareholder value for the firm’s potential
investments. Two managers with identical compensation contracts but facing different risk-return
tradeoffs may respond very differently to equity incentives. For example, increasing the amount of
equity-based compensation (i.e., delta) at a firm with a highly positive relation between risk and
shareholder value might motivate a manager to increase risk but have the opposite effect at a firm
with a negative or zero relation between the two. In contrast, prior literature largely assumes that
managers have relatively homogeneous responses to a particular incentive contract, independent
of the risk-return tradeoffs or other firm characteristics they may face.
Lastly, my results suggest a potential method to address the conflicting results in the prior
literature regarding how stock price exposure (i.e., delta) influences managerial risk-taking
incentives. For example, Coles et al. (2006) report that delta reduces risky investment but increases
stock volatility. Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2010), and Panousi
and Papanikolaou (2012) also suggest delta reduces risk-taking incentives, while Feng et al. (2011)
find a positive relationship between delta and financial misreporting and Armstrong and Vashishtha
(2012) find that delta increases stock volatility. This literature generally explains these mixed results
by arguing that delta provides two opposing risk-taking incentives and therefore the overall effect
is ambiguous. First, risk-taking may increase stock price and therefore incentivize risk-taking,
assuming that there is a positive relation between risk and return. Second, risk-taking may increase
stock price volatility, which managers are presumably averse to, and therefore disincentivize risktaking. Because the firm’s risk-return tradeoff is a key element determining the balance between

7

For example, boards may provide convex compensation contracts because they are a less costly form of
equity-based compensation and not because of any specific risk-taking objectives. I discuss this in more detail
in Section 5.
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these two effects, estimating this tradeoff may allow for clearer inferences regarding these opposing
incentives stemming from managers’ portfolio delta.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on
risk-related agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and the consequences of
managerial risk-taking incentives. Section 3 describes the research design and data I use in my
primary analyses and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 separates risk into systematic and
idiosyncratic components and evaluates whether risk-return tradeoffs and their relation with
incentive compensation depend on the type of risk involved. Section 6 explores the role of
managerial risk aversion in firms’ compensation design and Section 7 examines whether risk-return
tradeoffs provide risk-taking incentives incremental to their effect on managers’ equity-based
compensation. Section 8 presents robustness tests and Section 9 concludes.

2. Background and Hypotheses
2.1. Managerial risk aversion and agency conflicts
Prior literature argues that managerial risk aversion creates a number of potential agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Amihud and
Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Broadly speaking, these conflicts stem from managers’ inability
to fully diversify their exposure to firm-specific risks. Shareholders, in contrast, are generally viewed
as well-diversified with respect to these risks (i.e., risk-neutral) and therefore tend to desire greater
levels of risk-taking than managers. For example, both analytical and empirical studies typically
assume that managers hold relatively large proportions of their total wealth in their firm’s equity
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dittman and Maug, 2007; Conyon, Core, and Guay, 2011). 8 As
a result, managers have undiversified exposure to idiosyncratic risk in the firm’s stock price and
therefore may avoid investing in value-increasing projects that increase idiosyncratic risk.

8

Empirical studies typically rely on assumptions regarding the proportion of managerial wealth held in firm
equity because wealth data is unobservable. One exception is Becker (2006), who examines a sample of
Swedish CEOs and finds that these CEOs tend to hold significant portions of their total wealth in the firm’s
equity.
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Alternatively, managers may choose to invest in projects that reduce idiosyncratic risk, such as
diversifying acquisitions, which prior studies suggest reduces firm value (e.g., Lang and Stulz,
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). Forced turnover or other career concerns provide another potential
reason for managers to avoid investing in value-increasing risky projects, even in the absence of
large undiversified equity positions (Amihud and Lev, 1981). For example, heightened risk
increases managers’ likelihood of termination (Bushman, Dai, and Wang, 2010; Peters and
Wagner, 2014) and therefore career concerns may provide additional incentives for managers to
pass up risky projects that would increase firm value.
One commonly suggested solution to these risk-related agency costs is to provide
managers with incentive compensation that rewards risk-taking. In particular, many studies argue
that compensation contracts that are convex in firm value (e.g., stock options) increase managers’
incentives to take risk and therefore potentially reduce agency costs resulting from managerial risk
aversion (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985;
Guay, 1999). These contracts reward managers for taking additional risk by increasing expected
payoffs as risk rises and, consequently, may incentivize managers to take on greater amounts of
risk.9
Several studies note that, from a theoretical perspective, providing risk-averse managers
with convex compensation contracts does not necessarily induce them to increase risk (see, e.g.,
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004; Lewellen, 2006). This
occurs because in addition to increasing expected payoffs from risk-taking, these contracts also
increase the sensitivity of managers’ compensation to the firm’s value and therefore the uncertainty
surrounding the amount of their compensation. That is, while these contracts provide risk-taking
incentives through their convexity, they also make managers’ overall wealth more dependent on
the firm’s value. Because risk-averse managers have incentives to minimize uncertainty regarding
their wealth, this latter effect may motivate them to instead attempt to reduce the firm’s risk in order

9

For example, payoffs to an at-the-money stock option increase if the stock price increases but do not fall if
the stock price falls. Thus, investing in some project that either increases or decreases the firm’s stock price
by a given amount with equal probability (i.e., increases risk) increases expected payoffs from the option.
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to reduce this uncertainty. However, empirical studies examining this issue generally find that
convex payoffs, typically measured by option portfolio vega, motivate greater risk-taking (e.g.,
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009; Chava and
Purnanandam, 2010; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). Thus, despite the theoretical ambiguity
noted above, empirical evidence largely concludes that convex compensation contracts are
effective at increasing managers’ appetite for risk.10

2.2. Hypotheses
The relation between investment risk and shareholder value depends on firms’ investment
opportunity sets and may vary across firms. Standard mean-variance efficient asset pricing models
(e.g., Sharpe, 1964) suggest a positive relation between risk and required returns on potential
investment projects.11 Alternatively, shareholder value may increase with investment risk simply
due to limited liability, which shifts the consequences of negative project outcomes to other parties,
particularly for more levered firms (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, there are also
reasons that shareholder value may decline as investment risk rises. For example, competitive
advantages or other similar factors may give some limited subset of firms access to relatively high
return, low risk projects, while a wider set of firms may have access only to lower return, higher risk
projects. In this situation, there might be a negative relation between investment risk and
shareholder value. This idea is analogous to capital market models involving incomplete
information (e.g., Merton, 1987), where firms with relatively small potential investor bases (i.e., firmspecific investment opportunities) may have higher returns and lower risk than firms with broader
investor exposure.12 Thus, because the shape of firms’ investment opportunity sets is not clear, I
do not make any directional prediction regarding the relation between investment value and risk:

10

Specifically, the studies noted above document risk-taking incentives from vega after controlling for delta
(i.e., the overall amount of equity-based compensation). In other words, convex compensation contracts seem
to promote risk-taking relative to linear contracts that provide managers with the same exposure to stock price.
11 More generally, risk-averse managers may simply demand greater returns to invest in riskier projects,
leading to a positive relation between observed investment value and risk.
12 Many studies in the organizational theory literature, starting with Bowman (1980), also find a negative
relation between risk and return within the firm.
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H1: Investment value is related to investment risk.
Next, I consider how risk-return relations influence incentive compensation choices. Moral
hazard theory suggests that firms should provide more risk-taking incentives in situations where
potential risk-related agency costs are greater (e.g., Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz,
1985). The magnitude of these agency costs depends on the relation between risk and shareholder
value and the overall returns on the firm’s potential risky investments. For example, firms should
have little reason to provide risk-taking incentives if riskier potential investments, or the firm’s
potential investments in general, generate very little return (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Guay,
1999). In other words, risk itself is not valuable to shareholders; rather, it is the potential increase
in value associated with this risk (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John and John, 1993) that may
motivate shareholders to provide risk-taking incentives to managers. Furthermore, because
increased risk-taking also potentially imposes additional costs, firms should have less reason to
provide managers with risk-taking incentives if relatively low-risk investments generate large
returns. For example, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that riskier firms are more likely
to suffer cash flow shortfalls that prevent them from internally funding future investments. In the
presence of imperfect capital markets, this may prevent the firm from investing in value-increasing
projects in the future, to the detriment of shareholders. This discussion suggests my second set of
hypotheses, that firms provide more risk-taking incentives when the relation between investment
value and risk is more positive, and less when returns on low-risk investments are greater:
H2a: Firms provide more risk-taking incentives when risk-return relations are stronger
(more positive).
H2b: Firms provide fewer risk-taking incentives when returns on lower-risk investments are
larger.

10

3. Research Design and Data
3.1. Risk-return relations
I examine the relation between investment risk and shareholder value using
contemporaneous changes in the firm’s stock price and volatility. The basic idea behind this
analysis is that I view the firm as a collection of investment projects, and the firm’s value and risk
reflect this project portfolio. In any given year, the firm may choose to make new investments that
add to this collection of projects, potentially changing both the firm’s value and risk. I attempt to
capture the incremental effect of these new investments by examining contemporaneous relations
between equity value and volatility after controlling for factors other than new investment that may
also affect these quantities. Specifically, I first estimate the value of new investment projects using
the firm’s abnormal stock return after adjusting for the effect of unexpected earnings, as an
extensive stream of literature dating back to Ball and Brown (1968) finds that unexpected earnings
may influence stock prices.13 However, these earnings are unlikely to materially reflect cash inflows
generated by the current year’s investment projects, as both capital expenditures and R&D are
defined as costs whose associated cash inflows are expected to occur in future periods, rather than
the current period. Next, I estimate the risk associated with these investments using the change in
the firm’s stock volatility, after adjusting for changes in its size and leverage. I adjust for these
changes to attempt to isolate changes in the firm’s underlying risk, as stock price volatility is a
function of not only the firm’s underlying risk but also factors such as its size and capital structure
(see, e.g., Christie, 1982). That is, I estimate the value of new investment with residual abnormal
stock returns (controlling for unexpected earnings) and the risk of this investment with residual
change in stock volatility (controlling for size and leverage). However, these residual changes in
stock price and volatility also capture the effect of other factors besides new investments. To
address this issue, I estimate these measures using observations with large amounts of
unexpected investment to attempt to focus on situations where investment is most likely to be a

13

See Kothari (2001) for a review of the literature on earnings and stock prices.
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primary factor driving changes in the firm’s stock price and stock volatility. The following sections
describe this analysis in more detail.

3.1.1. Investment value
As described above, I estimate the value of a firm’s new investments in a given year as the
portion of annual abnormal stock return not explained by that year’s unexpected earnings, which
may influence stock price but are unlikely to include significant cash inflows stemming from the
current year’s investments. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑈𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

[1]

where 𝐴𝑅 is the firm’s market-adjusted return and 𝑈𝑋 is unexpected earnings, defined as the
change in earnings from the prior year. 14 I estimate this model separately for each industry-year
(i.e., I assume the mapping between earnings and returns is relatively constant across firms within
an industry-year). I define the value of the firm’s new investments during the year as the residual 𝑢
from this model.

3.1.2. Investment risk
Similarly, I estimate the risk of investment in a given year using the change in the firm’s
stock volatility not explained by changes in its size and leverage, as changes in either of these
quantities may influence the firm’s stock volatility without any change in the firm’s underlying risk.
Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
Δ𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 Δ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾2 Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡

[2]

where Δ𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock return, Δ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is the change in
the firm’s market capitalization, and Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣 is the change in firm’s leverage. I again estimate the

14

I add back depreciation and R&D expense to reported earnings when computing this measure to attempt to
eliminate the effect of investment costs on earnings. My inferences are unchanged if I instead use reported
earnings, unadjusted for depreciation and R&D expense during the period.
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model separately for each industry-year. I define risk of the firm’s investments during the year as
the residual 𝑤 from equation 2.15

3.1.3. Investment value and risk
I examine the relation between the value and risk of the firm’s new investments by
comparing the investment value estimated in Section 3.1.1 (i.e., 𝑢 in equation 1) with the investment
risk estimated in Section 3.1.2 (i.e., 𝑤 in equation 2). If investment value is positively (negatively)
associated with investment risk, there should be a positive (negative) relation between the two
measures. I first test whether there exists a linear relation between the two measures by estimating
the following model:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡

[3]

where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 is the residual 𝑢 from equation 1 and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the residual 𝑤 from equation 2. As
mentioned above, I estimate this model using observations with relatively large amounts of
unexpected investment in order to focus on firms where I can best identify investment value and
risk, and therefore the relation between the two.16 Specifically, I estimate equation 3 using firms
with top-quartile unexpected investment.17 I compute the firm’s unexpected investment during the
year by first estimating expected investment levels as follows (see, e.g., Hubbard, 1998):
𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡

[4]

where 𝐼 is new investment, scaled by lagged market capitalization, 𝐶𝐹 is operating cash flow plus
R&D expense, scaled by lagged market capitalization, and 𝑆𝐺 is percentage sales growth. I follow
Richardson (2006) and define new investment as the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expense,
and acquisitions in the current year less sales of PP&E and depreciation. As in equations 1 and 2,

15

To be more precise, this residual-based measure captures unexpectedly large or small changes in volatility,
given the amount of investment in the period (i.e., investment with above- or below-average risk). This is
because changes in the firm’s size are likely to partially reflect increased investment during the period, and
thus I effectively control for the average effect of investment on stock volatility.
16 For example, estimating investment value and risk is not practical when investment is very close to zero.
17 This corresponds to firms with unexpected investment in excess of approximately 3 percent of market
capitalization.
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I estimate this model separately for each industry-year. I define unexpected investment as the
residual 𝑣 from equation 4.
I also consider the possibility that the relation between investment value and risk may be
non-linear. For example, risk-averse managers may require greater returns for increases in risk as
risk becomes larger (i.e., managers face increasing marginal costs of risk), potentially resulting in
a convex relation between observed investment value and risk. Alternatively, there may be
diminishing returns to increasing investment risk, which could instead result in a concave relation.
To examine these possibilities, I extend equation 3 by adding a quadratic risk term as follows:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡2

[5]

where, as in equation 3, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 is the residual 𝑢 from equation 1 and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the residual 𝑤 from
equation 2. A positive (negative) coefficient 𝜃2 would be consistent with a convex (concave) relation
between investment value and risk. I estimate both equations 3 and 5 with industry-year fixed
effects to account for the possibility that investment value or risk may naturally vary across different
industries and over time.
Equations 3 and 5 estimate the relation between investment value and risk without
controlling for the amount of unexpected investment (i.e., they do not control for the scale of the
firm’s investments). As a further analysis, I also estimate risk-return relations with equations 3 and
5 after scaling investment value and risk by the amount of unexpected investment in the period.
Specifically, I divide the value and risk measures defined in equations 1 and 2 by unexpected
investment as defined in equation 4. This essentially converts these measures into “per dollar”
quantities, as opposed to aggregated or firm-level quantities, and allows me to evaluate whether
investments that carry more risk per dollar of investment generate larger returns. This distinction
between aggregate and per-dollar investment is important if firms primarily change their investment
risk by reallocating their investment dollars between relatively riskier or less risky projects, rather
than adjusting their total amount of investment (i.e., they adjust the mix of investments rather than
the scale). For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) argue that managers with differing risk
preferences alter the mix of riskier and less risky projects in their overall investment pool, rather
14

than (or possibly in addition to) adjusting total investment levels (i.e., the scale of investment).
Appendix B discusses the distinction between aggregate and per-dollar investment in more detail.
In my subsequent tests examining incentive compensation, I primarily focus on these perdollar (scaled) investment value and risk measures to focus on the variation in risk-taking most
likely to reflect managerial discretion. 18 For example, managers at firms facing capital constraints
may have limited ability to increase the scale of their investments. However, I expect that they
should have more discretion over the mix of projects that they select. That is, while factors outside
managers’ control may constrain the amount of total investment they may undertake (i.e., their
investment budget), they should have more flexibility in how to allocate this budget among various
potential projects.

3.2. Incentive compensation and risk-return tradeoffs
Next, I consider how the relation between investment value and risk (i.e., the risk-return
tradeoff) influences firms’ incentive compensation policies. To estimate firms’ risk-return tradeoffs,
I re-estimate equation 3 separately for each industry-year.19 Thus, unlike in Section 3.1, where I
assume that all firms face the same investment risk-return tradeoffs (i.e., in equation 3, 𝛿1 is the
same for all firms), I now assume only that all firms within the same industry-year face the same
risk-return tradeoffs. I use the observed relations between investment value and risk within each
industry-year to estimate these risk-return tradeoffs. My estimate of the strength of the relation
between value and risk for each firm in that industry-year is the coefficient 𝛿1 from equation 3. That
is, I assume firms within the same industry-year have similar investment opportunity sets and
therefore use my industry-year-level estimated risk-return tradeoff to proxy for the tradeoff that each

18

I obtain similar inferences if I instead estimate risk-return relations using my unscaled investment value and
risk measures.
19 I exclude industry-years for which I have 10 or fewer observations when estimating these models. My
inferences are similar using alternative minimum observation thresholds (e.g., 5 or 15 observations). As
discussed in Section 3.1.3, I estimate these models using scaled investment risk and return measures (i.e.,
risk and return per dollar of investment).
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firm within that industry-year.20 For firms in industry-years where 𝛿1 is larger, the benefits to
increasing investment risk are greater. Similarly, I estimate the expected return on lower-risk
investments within an industry-year with the coefficient 𝛿0 from equation 3. For firms in industryyears where 𝛿0 is larger, the returns on lower-risk investment are greater.
Using these risk-return tradeoff and lower-risk investment return measures, I test my
second hypothesis by estimating regressions of the following form:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜅2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠

[6]

where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 , respectively, estimated from equation 3
as described above and 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is an incentive-compensation measure. Consistent with prior
literature examining equity-based compensation, my primary measure of risk-taking incentives is
the manager’s portfolio vega, defined as the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to a one percentage
point change in the firm’s stock volatility. H2 implies that 𝜅1 > 0 and 𝜅2 < 0 in equation 6. I also
examine how risk-return tradeoffs influence managers’ overall levels of equity-based compensation
by estimating equation 6 using the manager’s portfolio delta as an incentive measure, where delta
is defined as the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to a one percent change in the firm’s stock
price. One possibility is that delta is more effective at aligning managers’ and shareholders’
interests when the relation between risk and value is stronger, suggesting a positive relation
between delta and risk-return tradeoffs. Alternatively, if greater delta primarily increases managerial
risk aversion, as some prior studies suggest (e.g., Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010; Chava and
Purnanandam, 2010), shareholders may want to reduce delta when risk-return tradeoffs are
stronger.

3.3. Data
I estimate the risk-return relations described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 using financial data
from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP. Consistent with prior literature, I omit financial

20

As I discuss in more detail in Section 8, I use these industry-year (rather than firm-specific) measures to
help alleviate endogeneity concerns regarding how managers’ incentive compensation contracts may
influence their firm’s risk-return tradeoffs.
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firms and utilities. My initial sample consists of 115,641 firm-year observations for which I have
stock returns and sufficient data to compute new investment and spans the years 1987 through
2012. Because my tests require year-to-year changes for certain measures, the sample for which
I am able to compute my investment value and risk measures consists of 83,211 firm-year
observations. As described previously, I estimate risk-return relations using firm-years with topquartile unexpected investment in order to focus on firms where I can best identify investment value
and risk. This reduces the final sample that I use to estimate equations 3 and 5 to 20,956 firm-year
observations, which consists of 6,903 distinct firms. I winsorize all variables used in these models
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
For my tests involving incentive compensation, I supplement the sample described above
with managerial incentives based on data from Execucomp and Equilar. Specifically, I compute
CEO delta and vega using the method described in Core and Guay (2002). The sample of firms for
which I have managerial incentive data consists of 40,064 firm-year observations between the
years 1992 and 2012. I have sufficient data to compute my risk-return relation measures for 33,139
of these observations and estimate equation 6 using this reduced sample, which consists of 4,194
distinct firms.21
3.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample used in my tests on the relation
between investment value and risk. The median market-adjusted return is negative (about negative
8 percent), while median new investment is approximately 4 percent of the firm’s market
capitalization. The median firm in my sample has a market capitalization of approximately $150
million, a book-to-market ratio of 0.88, and annualized stock volatility of 55 percent. In general,
these measures are consistent with prior studies examining the sample of Compustat-CRSP firms.

21

Note that this incentive compensation sample is larger than the 20,956-observation sample that I use to
estimate industry-year risk-return relations. This is because I estimate these relations using only firms with
top-quartile unexpected investment, then apply the estimated relation to all firms within that industry-year (i.e.,
including those without top-quartile unexpected investment).
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Table 1, Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the sample for my tests on incentive
compensation. Compared with the sample in Panel A, median market-adjusted returns are higher
(about negative 2 percent), while investment is similar between the two samples. The median firm
in my incentive compensation sample is somewhat larger than the median firm from my sample in
Panel A, with a median market capitalization of approximately $600 million. Median book-to-market
ratio and annualized stock volatility are lower than in Panel A, at 0.77 and 46 percent, respectively.
The median manager in my sample has delta of approximately $150,000 and vega of approximately
$25,000. These amounts are somewhat smaller than the figures reported in prior literature,
reflecting the fact that the Equilar incentive data included in my sample includes smaller firms than
those included in Execucomp.22

3.5. Investment value and risk characteristics
Before testing my hypotheses, I examine whether the characteristics of the investment
value and risk measures described in Section 3.1 seem consistent with the underlying constructs
they are intended to capture. I first consider my investment risk measure. R&D investment is
generally viewed as more risky than capital expenditures (e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). This suggests that investment risk should be larger when the firm
spends more on R&D compared to capital spending. To test this prediction, I regress my investment
risk measures (both scaled and unscaled) on R&D and capital expenditures. I include industry-year
fixed effects when estimating these models and also control for a standard set of lagged firm-level
characteristics (e.g., size, book-to-market, and leverage). Table 2 presents the results. Columns 1
and 2 present results for unscaled, or “total” investment risk, while columns 3 and 4 present results
for scaled, or “per-dollar” investment risk. Columns 1 and 3 report results from a model with only
R&D, capital expenditures, and industry-year fixed effects, while columns 2 and 4 also include other
firm-level controls. Consistent with the reasoning above, I find that investment risk is positively

22

Descriptive statistics for delta and vega based on Execucomp data are comparable to prior studies (about
$200,000 and $40,000 at the median, respectively).
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related with R&D, and more positively related with R&D than capital expenditures, under all
specifications (p < 0.01 in each specification).
Next, I evaluate my investment value measure. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013)
measure returns on investment by examining the relation between investment and future sales
growth. Specifically, they regress sales growth on prior investment and argue that larger investment
coefficients represent more profitable investments. I employ a similar approach and regress my
investment value measures (both scaled and unscaled) on future sales growth. If these measures
capture investment value, the coefficients on future sales growth should be positive. As in my
investment risk tests, I include industry-year fixed effects and include standard firm-level controls.
Table 3 presents the results. Similar to Table 2, columns 1 and 2 present results for unscaled “total”
investment value, while columns 3 and 4 present results for scaled “per-dollar” investment value.
Columns 1 and 3 provide results from a model with only future sales growth and industry-year fixed
effects, while columns 2 and 4 also include other firm-level controls. Under all specifications, I find
that investment value is positively associated with future sales growth, consistent with this measure
capturing returns on investment.

4. Results
4.1. Risk-return relations
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equations 3 and 5, which examine the relation
between investment value and risk. Columns 1 and 2 report results based on unscaled investment
value and risk measures. I find that the estimated coefficient on investment risk is positive and
significant in both specifications (0.40 and 0.39 in columns 1 and 2, respectively, p < 0.01 for both).
These coefficients imply that an investment which increases the firm’s stock volatility by one
percentage point corresponds to an approximately 40 basis point increase in firm value. 23 Column

To put this into some context, I compute an average “cost of risk” over my sample period based on the
Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio. The average annual excess return in my sample period is 7.1% with a
standard deviation of 16.8%, or approximately 42 basis points of return per percentage point of risk. This is
roughly consistent with the cost of risk implied by the risk-return tradeoffs that I estimate.
23
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2 in Table 4 suggests that the relation between investment value and risk is slightly convex, as the
estimated coefficient on squared investment risk is positive. However, this result is not statistically
significant at conventional levels (p = 0.12). Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the
assumption throughout much of the agency theory literature that firms face risk-return tradeoffs
when making investment decisions. Figure 1 plots the estimated relation between investment value
and risk based on the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.
Columns 3 and 4 report results from estimating equations 3 and 5 after scaling investment
value and risk by unexpected investment (i.e., per-dollar value and risk). I find that this scaled
investment value also increases as risk increases, suggesting riskier investments (per dollar)
generate greater expected returns (coefficient of 0.35 in both columns, p < 0.01). The coefficient
on unscaled investment risk in column 1 is somewhat larger than the coefficient on scaled
investment risk in column 3 (p = 0.04), which is consistent with the positive relation between
investment value and risk in columns 1 and 2 being driven by both larger amounts of risky
investment and a greater proportion of riskier, more profitable investments. This suggests that riskrelated agency costs arise both from risk-averse managers investing in fewer risky projects, and in
projects that are less risky, than shareholders would prefer.
In contrast to the results in column 2, the positive relation between scaled investment value
and risk seems to be concave, as the coefficient on squared investment risk is significantly negative
in column 4 (-0.011, p < 0.01).24 Thus, while riskier investments (per dollar) seem to generate
greater returns, there appear to be diminishing returns as risk continues to increase. Figure 2 plots
the estimated relation between per-dollar investment value and risk based on the results in columns
3 and 4 and Table 5 ranks industries in my sample by their time-series average risk-return tradeoff.
The industries with the most favorable risk-return tradeoffs (i.e., largest benefits to risk-taking) are
apparel, construction, and personal services. The industries with the least favorable tradeoffs are
printing and publishing, fabricated products, and consumer goods.

24

This difference in convexity between unscaled and scaled investment is consistent with firms receiving
diversification benefits as they increase the amount of total investment.
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Next, I examine industry characteristics that I expect to be associated with these risk-return
tradeoffs. First, more competitive industries are likely to have more positive risk-return tradeoffs,
as firms “compete away” the payoffs to lower risk projects and therefore must take on riskier
projects to increase value. That is, I expect firms in more competitive industries to have less access
to relatively high return, low risk projects. Second, industries with fewer growth opportunities may
also have more positive risk-return tradeoffs. This lack of growth opportunities should lead to
greater competition among available projects and again drive down the payoffs to less risky
projects. I test these hypotheses by regressing my estimated risk-return tradeoffs on industry
competition and growth opportunities. 25 I also include year fixed effects to attempt to control for
other economy-wide factors that may change over time and influence risk-return tradeoffs. I
measure industry competition with the Herfindahl index, computed as the sum of squared market
shares within an industry-year, and I measure growth opportunities with the average book-tomarket ratio within an industry-year. Smaller values for these measures indicate increased
competition and greater growth opportunities, respectively; thus, the discussion above suggests a
negative (positive) relation between risk-return tradeoffs and Herfindahl index (book-to-market).
Table 6 presents the results from this analysis. Column 1 reports results for only industry
competition, column 2 reports results for only growth opportunities, and column 3 reports results
for both measures. I find a significantly negative relation between risk-return tradeoffs and
Herfindahl index, consistent with risk-taking providing greater benefits in more competitive
industries. I also find a positive relation between risk-return tradeoffs and book-to-market,
consistent with greater benefits from risk-taking when firms have fewer growth opportunities.

25

Recall that I estimate risk-return tradeoffs by industry-year, and thus for this analysis my sample consists of
one observation per industry-year. There are 583 total industry-years in my sample for which I have sufficient
data to estimate risk-return tradeoffs.
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4.2. Incentive compensation and risk-return tradeoffs
Table 7 presents the results from examining the relation between risk-return tradeoffs and
incentive compensation based on equation 6. 26 Column 1 reports results with vega as the
dependent variable and column 2 reports results with delta. The estimated coefficient on the riskreturn tradeoff is significantly positive in column 1 (0.025, p < 0.01), indicating that firms provide
more convex incentive compensation contracts (i.e., higher vega) when the relation between
investment risk and value is stronger. In other words, firms provide more incentives to take risk
when the potential benefits from such risk-taking (or, alternatively, the costs from managerial risk
aversion) are greater. In terms of economic magnitude, this coefficient implies that firms with the
largest risk-return tradeoffs (i.e., greatest incremental returns to risk-taking) provide their managers
with approximately 30 percent higher vega compared to firms with the smallest risk-return tradeoffs.
I also find that firms provide more equity-based compensation, but not more convex
compensation, when the return on lower-risk investment is greater. Specifically, I find a significantly
positive relation between delta and lower-risk return in column 2 (coefficient of 0.013, p < 0.01) but
a significantly negative relation between vega and lower-risk return in column 1 (coefficient of 0.015, p < 0.01). These coefficients imply that firms with the largest lower-risk returns (i.e., greatest
incremental returns to projects that do not increase risk) provide their managers with approximately
15 percent higher delta and 20 percent lower vega compared to firms with the smallest lower-risk
returns. These results are consistent with firms offering convex compensation contracts when they
seek to motivate risky investment, rather than investment in general. For example, when lower-risk
investment is relatively profitable, firms may have weaker incentives to motivate managers to invest
specifically in higher-risk projects. Overall, the results in Table 7 support the idea that firms design
their managers’ risk-taking incentives to mitigate risk-related agency costs.

26

As discussed in Section 3.1.3, I estimate these risk-return tradeoffs using scaled (per-dollar) investment risk
and return measures. My inferences are unchanged if I instead estimate these relations with unscaled
measures.
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5. Systematic vs. Idiosyncratic Risk-Return Tradeoffs
In this section, I examine whether the relations between incentive compensation structures
and risk-return tradeoffs in Section 4 depend on the type of risk involved (i.e., systematic or
idiosyncratic). The analysis in the previous section does not distinguish between these different
types of risk, and the distinction is potentially important because risk-related agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders primarily stem from managers’ aversion to idiosyncratic risk,
rather than risk in general (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Lewellen, Loderer,
and Martin, 1987). If shareholder value and risk are positively correlated but this relation is due
purely to effects from systematic risk, there may be no significant risk-related agency conflict
between managers and shareholders. However, if this relation results from firms earning greater
returns on projects with greater idiosyncratic risk, managers’ and shareholders’ incentives may be
more misaligned. Specifically, risk-related agency conflicts arise from differential preferences for
risk between managers and shareholders. Because both of these parties are averse to systematic
risk (i.e., because shareholders cannot diversify this type of risk), differences in tolerance for
systematic risk between managers and shareholders are likely to be relatively minor compared to
differences with regard to idiosyncratic risk, which is much more difficult for managers to diversify.
Given that risk-related agency costs largely result from managers’ exposure to
undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks, firms seeking to mitigate these costs should primarily be
interested in providing managers with risk-taking incentives when firm value is related to
idiosyncratic risk, rather than systematic risk. That is, potential risk-related agency costs are largest
when the firm has access to high-NPV investments that managers might avoid due to their aversion
to idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, managers should require fewer incentives to invest in positive-NPV
projects that increase systematic risk, since managers and shareholders are both averse to such
risk and consequently their incentives are better aligned. In fact, some studies indicate that
managers may be less averse to systematic risk than the typical shareholder (e.g., Dittman and
Maug, 2007; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013). As a result, shareholders might actually want to
disincentivize investment in projects with systematic risk.
23

Examining differential effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risk also allows me to
evaluate an alternative explanation for the use of convex equity-based compensation contracts;
namely, that firms provide convex compensation contracts to their managers not to help manage
risk-related agency conflicts, but rather because these contracts are more “powerful” than linear
contracts (i.e., compared to linear contracts, convex contracts tend to magnify managers’ sensitivity
to stock price; see, e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert and Larcker, 2004; Ross,
2004). Lambert and Larcker (2004) discuss how convex compensation contracts may be optimal
even in the absence of risk-related agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
Specifically, they demonstrate that the optimal compensation contract between a risk-neutral
manager and risk-neutral shareholders may be convex in firm value if managerial wealth
constraints prevent shareholders from addressing potential agency conflicts by simply selling the
firm to the risk-neutral manager (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979). This occurs
because convex contracts offer a relatively low-cost way for firms to provide their managers with
exposure to the firm’s stock price (i.e., delta). That is, firms may design compensation contracts to
provide an optimal level of delta, while any risk-related incentive effects may be “unintended
consequences” of these convex contracts rather than their primary objective.
One potential explanation for the results in Section 4 is that shareholders are more
receptive to these potential risk-related “side effects” and consequently employ more convex
compensation contracts when risk-return tradeoffs are more favorable. Under this explanation, the
relation between compensation convexity and risk-return tradeoffs need not be tied to the particular
type of risk involved. That is, if any benefits (or costs) from risk-taking are simply a side effect of
achieving a targeted level of delta with a relatively low-cost compensation contract, whether these
benefits result from systematic or idiosyncratic risk should be irrelevant to the contract’s design. If
anything, firms in this situation may be more inclined to give equity-based risk-taking incentives
when systematic risk-return tradeoffs are stronger, given that Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012)
find that such incentives are more effective at promoting systematic, rather than idiosyncratic, risktaking.
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To examine whether the relation between firms’ incentive compensation contracts and their
risk-return tradeoffs varies between systematic and idiosyncratic risk, I decompose total stock
volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic components based on a market model. 27 I then reestimate investment risk based on equation 2 using changes in each of these components, rather
than total stock volatility. Specifically, I define systematic (idiosyncratic) investment risk as the
residual from estimating equation 2 with the change in systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility as the
dependent variable. I then re-estimate systematic (idiosyncratic) risk-return tradeoffs with equation
3 using this systematic (idiosyncratic) investment risk, rather than overall investment risk. Finally, I
re-estimate equation 6 using these two investment risk measures, both individually and
simultaneously.
Table 8 reports the results from this analysis. I find that the positive relation shown in Table
7 between vega and risk-return tradeoffs is driven by idiosyncratic risk-return tradeoffs (estimated
coefficients of 0.021 in both columns 2 and 3, p < 0.01). In contrast, I find no significant relation
between vega and systematic risk-return tradeoffs, and the estimated coefficients are negative in
both columns 1 and 3. That is, firms seem to provide more convex compensation contracts only
when idiosyncratic risk, rather than systematic risk, is more strongly associated with investment
value. These results are consistent with risk-related agency costs arising largely from managerial
aversion to idiosyncratic risks, rather than risk in general, and shareholders designing incentive
compensation packages accordingly. Furthermore, the lack of any significant association between
compensation convexity and systematic risk-return tradeoffs suggests that any use of stock options
as “high-powered” sources of delta when risk-taking in general is more favorable does not appear
to be a primary factor behind the results discussed in the previous section.

27

I obtain similar results to those described in this section if I instead estimate systematic and idiosyncratic
risk with three-factor Fama-French (1993) or four-factor Carhart (1997) models.
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6. Managerial Risk Aversion
Next, I examine whether managerial risk aversion influences the relation between risktaking incentives and risk-return tradeoffs described in Sections 4 and 5. If firms provide managers
with more convex compensation contracts to help mitigate risk-related agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders, it is plausible that this effect should be stronger for firms with more
risk-averse managers (to the extent that the board can observe or discern managers’ risk aversion).
The severity of these agency conflicts depends on managerial risk aversion; in the extreme, if
managers and shareholders are both risk-neutral, there should be no risk-related agency conflicts
between the two parties. To examine whether the relation between managers’ compensation
convexity and firms’ risk-return tradeoffs varies depending on risk aversion, I estimate this relation
separately for CEOs with relatively high and relatively low risk aversion. The discussion above
suggests that the relation between these two measures should be stronger (more positive) for
CEOs with relatively high risk aversion.
I measure CEO risk aversion based on Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who tie households’
lifetime stock market returns (“experienced returns”) to risk aversion. 28 Specifically, they find that
households with lower experienced returns have greater risk aversion, generalizing the
“Depression babies” effect discussed in other studies (e.g., Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011),
where individuals growing up during the Great Depression exhibit greater risk aversion. In each
year, I define CEOs with bottom-tercile experienced returns as “high risk-aversion” managers and
CEOs with top-tercile experienced returns as “low risk-aversion” managers. I then re-estimate the
relation between convexity in managers’ compensation contracts and risk-return tradeoffs
separately for these two categories of CEOs. 29

28

I choose this measure of risk aversion for several reasons. First, it is available for all CEOs in my sample
because the only data requirement is the CEO’s age. Second, it exhibits a reasonable amount of crosssectional variation. Third, it is not derived from the CEO’s equity-based compensation, which limits reverse
causality concerns.
29 Following Malmendier and Nagel (2011), I compute experienced returns as the weighted average of
inflation-adjusted equity returns over each CEO’s lifetime, where the weights decline linearly from the previous
year to zero in the CEO’s year of birth. For example, suppose a CEO is born in year 0. In year 3, the respective
weights for years 1 and 2 would be 1/3 and 2/3. Likewise, in year 4, the respective weights for years 1, 2, and
3 would be 1/6, 2/6, and 3/6.
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Table 9 presents results from estimating these models. Column 1 provides results for low
risk-aversion managers and column 2 provides results for high risk-aversion managers. I find that
the positive relation between compensation convexity and risk-return tradeoffs appears to be
concentrated among relatively risk-averse CEOs, as the risk-return tradeoff coefficient is larger and
statistically significant only in column 2. However, the difference between the coefficients in the low
and high risk-aversion samples is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.23).
Overall, these results provide some evidence that the relation between risk-return tradeoffs and
incentive convexity is largest among relatively risk-averse CEOs, consistent with firms designing
their compensation contracts to help alleviate agency conflicts stemming from managerial risk
aversion.

7. Risk-Taking Choices and Risk-Return Tradeoffs
In this section, I consider how the relation between firm value and risk influences managers’
risk-taking choices.30 Managers at firms where the relation between investment value and risk is
more positive should be more inclined to take on risk, as their potential benefits from this risk-taking
are greater. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) argue that R&D expenditures are high-risk
investments compared to capital expenditures and therefore firms (or managers) seeking to
increase investment risk may allocate investment toward R&D and away from capital expenditures.
This suggests that firms with weaker risk-return relations and higher returns on lower-risk
investments may be more inclined to make capital investments. In contrast, firms with stronger riskreturn relations may be more likely to invest in R&D and less likely to invest in capital spending. I
test these hypotheses by estimating the following set of regressions:
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠

[7]

At a firm level, managers’ risk-taking choices likely also affect the relation between firm value and risk (i.e.,
the causality may be reversed). However, because I estimate these relations at an industry-year level, it is
unlikely that any particular manager’s choices will meaningfully influence the estimated relations between firm
value and risk across the industry-year. I discuss this issue in more detail in Section 8.1.
30
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is either capital expenditures or R&D expense, scaled by lagged total assets,
and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are defined as in Section 3.2. The hypotheses above imply
𝜆1 < 0 and 𝜆2 > 0 for capital expenditures, and 𝜆1 > 0 and 𝜆2 < 0 for R&D.
Table 10 presents the results from estimating equation 7. Consistent with the preceding
discussion, I find significantly positive associations between capital expenditures and the estimated
returns on lower-risk investments (coefficient of 0.059, p < 0.01) and between R&D expenditures
and the estimated relation between investment risk and return (coefficient of 0.083, p < 0.01).
Likewise, I find significantly negative associations between capital expenditures and the investment
risk-return relation (coefficient of -0.055, p = 0.09) and between R&D expenditures and the returns
on lower-risk investments (coefficient of -0.061, p = 0.03). These relations are incremental to
incentive effects of delta and vega previously documented in the risk-taking literature, although the
economic magnitude of the effects that I estimate are often somewhat smaller than those of delta
and vega.31 Thus, I find some evidence that managers respond directly to risk-return tradeoffs
rather than only through their incentive compensation. One possible explanation for this result is
that managers benefit when their firm’s cash flows increase, even if they do not directly receive
these cash flows (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), and therefore have greater incentives to take
on risk when riskier investment generates greater returns. Another possibility is that the firm’s riskreturn relation influences how managers respond to their equity incentives. For example, delta is
more likely to provide risk-taking incentives when the expected returns to riskier investments are
larger (e.g., John and John, 1993).
To evaluate this second possibility further, I examine whether the relation between delta
and investment varies depending on risk-return tradeoffs.32 To do so, I create two subsamples

31

For example, the difference in expected R&D investment as a percentage of assets between managers with
the greatest and least amount of vega is approximately 3 percentage points (about 60 percent of mean R&D
investment in the sample), while the difference between managers with the strongest and weakest risk-return
tradeoffs is approximately 1 percentage point (about 20 percent).
32 I focus only on delta in this test because there is no obvious reason why the relation between vega and
investment should depend on risk-return tradeoffs. Specifically, vega captures the manager’s “direct”
incentives to increase risk, independent of any effect of this increased risk on firm value, and therefore these
incentives should not vary based on the relation between risk and firm value (i.e., the firm’s risk-return
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based on firms’ estimated risk-return relations. The first subsample consists of firms where I
estimate a statistically significant positive relation between investment risk and return (the “high
risk-return tradeoff” sample), while the second subsample consists of firms where I find either an
insignificant or a significantly negative relation (the “low risk-return tradeoff” sample).33 I then
estimate the following set of regressions across these two subsamples:
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠

[8]

where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is either R&D expense or capital expenditures, as in equation 7. If delta provides
more risk-taking incentives when the “returns on risk” are relatively large, I expect to find 𝜋1 for
R&D investment is greater for the high risk-return tradeoff sample. If this occurs because managers
shift investment away from capital expenditures, I may also find 𝜋1 for capital investment is smaller
for this sample.
Table 11 reports results from estimating equation 8. Columns 1 and 2 provide results with
capital expenditures as the dependent variable and columns 3 and 4 provide results with R&D
expense. Consistent with the hypothesis above, I find that the relation between delta and R&D
investment is significantly negative for firms in the low risk-return tradeoff sample but essentially
zero for firms in the high risk-return tradeoff sample. The coefficient in the high risk-return tradeoff
sample is also significantly larger than the coefficient in the low risk-return tradeoff sample
(difference = 0.16, p < 0.01). This is consistent with greater delta motivating managers to reduce
risky investment when the returns from increasing risk-taking are relatively small, but having no
effect when such returns are relatively large. In contrast, I find no significant difference in the
relation between delta and capital expenditures across the two subsamples.

tradeoff). Consistent with this reasoning, I find no significant differences in the relation between vega and
investment across the high and low risk-return tradeoff samples in Table 9.
33 I measure significance at the 10 percent level. Approximately 25 percent of observations fall into the “high
risk-return tradeoff” sample. Results are similar if I instead assess significance at the 5 or 15 percent level.
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8. Robustness Tests
In this section, I present results from several robustness tests. First, I examine the potential
effect of an endogenous relation between the risk-return tradeoffs that I estimate and firms’
incentive compensation structures. Second, I include manager fixed effects when estimating the
relation between risk-return tradeoffs and managers’ incentive compensation contracts to examine
the possibility that managers with different risk or compensation preferences may “self-select” into
firms with different risk-return profiles. Finally, I estimate risk-return relations based on abnormal
returns from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, rather than market-adjusted returns, to examine
whether the results in the preceding sections depend on a specific expected returns model.

8.1. Endogenous relation between risk-return tradeoffs and incentive compensation
One potential concern with the results described in the preceding sections is that there may
be an endogenous relation between firms’ risk-return tradeoffs and their incentive compensation
structures. That is, although I argue that firms appear to design their compensation structures in
response to the risk-return tradeoffs that they face, the risk-return tradeoffs that I estimate may also
reflect the effect of managers’ incentive compensation on their investment choices. Two factors
limit the potential effect of this concern in this setting. First, any reverse causality (i.e., observed
risk-return tradeoffs reflecting the effect of managers’ compensation contracts on their investment
choices) is likely to cause a negative relation between compensation convexity and risk-return
tradeoffs. Risk-taking incentives diminish the costs that managers face from bearing from additional
risk and, consequently, managers with more risk-taking incentives should require smaller
incremental returns to invest in riskier projects (i.e., more negative risk-return tradeoffs). In other
words, if managers’ compensation contracts do influence firms’ risk-return tradeoffs, this effect is
likely to attenuate the positive relation between compensation contract convexity and risk-return
tradeoffs that I hypothesize.
Second, the research design described in Section 3 also helps mitigate these endogeneity
concerns. Because I estimate risk-return tradeoffs at an industry-year level, rather than a firm30

specific level, it is unlikely that any particular firm’s compensation contract design meaningfully
influences risk-return tradeoffs for other firms within the same industry-year. That is, while a firm’s
compensation contract may influence the specific level of risk (and value) that a manager chooses
to invest in, it is not likely to influence the relation between risk and firm value across the entire
industry-year, and it is this industry-year measure that I use to capture risk-return tradeoffs.
Notwithstanding the discussion above, I conduct two additional analyses to examine the
potential effect of an endogenous relation between the risk-return tradeoffs that I estimate and
firms’ incentive compensation structures. First, I re-estimate the relation between compensation
contract convexity and risk-return tradeoffs using lagged risk-return tradeoffs. Even if managers’
incentive compensation does influence the risk-return tradeoffs that I estimate for the industry-year,
it is not plausible that their compensation contracts influence risk-return tradeoffs in the prior year.
Table 12 presents results from this analysis. I continue to find a significantly positive relation
between managers’ vega and risk-return tradeoffs, with nearly identical magnitudes and statistical
significance, suggesting that these results are not driven by the potential effects of incentive
compensation contracts on risk-return tradeoffs across an industry-year.
Next, I re-estimate this relation between vega and risk-return tradeoffs excluding firms that
I use to estimate risk-return tradeoffs. Recall that I estimate these risk-return tradeoffs using firms
with top-quartile abnormal investment to focus on firms where I can best identify the effects of
incremental investment choices. I then assume all firms within an industry-year have similar
investment opportunity sets and therefore apply the same risk-return tradeoff to all firms in that
industry-year. This allows me to examine the relation between managers’ compensation convexity
and risk-return tradeoffs using these remaining firms (i.e., those in the bottom three investment
quartiles), whose compensation contracts are more unlikely to influence the risk-return tradeoffs
that I estimate. Table 13 presents results excluding firms that I use to estimate risk-return tradeoffs.
I continue to find a significantly positive relation between managers’ vega and risk-return tradeoffs,
although the coefficient is somewhat smaller and statistical significance is slightly weaker (p = 0.02).
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This attenuated result seems reasonable given that my risk-return tradeoff measures are likely
noisier for this subset of firms that I exclude from my risk-return estimations.

8.2. Manager fixed effects
It is possible that the relation between firms’ risk-return tradeoffs and managers’ incentive
compensation structures reflects managers with different risk or compensation preferences
choosing (or “self-selecting”) to work at firms with certain types of risk-return tradeoffs. For example,
more risk-tolerant managers may prefer to work at firms with greater returns to risk-taking and also
be more willing or likely to accept compensation packages with more risk-taking incentives. This
could result in a positive relation between firms’ risk-return tradeoffs and managers’ risk-taking
incentives without firms choosing to adjust their compensation policies in response to the risk-return
tradeoffs that they face. To examine this possibility, I re-estimate equation 6 including manager
fixed effects. To the extent that managers’ preferences are time-invariant, this should capture the
effect of different types of managers self-selecting into different types of firms.
Table 14 provides the results from this model with manager fixed effects. Consistent with
the results in Table 7, I continue to find a significantly positive relation between firms’ risk-return
tradeoffs and managers’ vega (coefficient of 0.014, p < 0.01). Thus, time-invariant manager
preferences do not appear to explain the relation between risk-return tradeoffs and managers’ risktaking incentives reported in previous sections. In contrast, the relation between lower-risk
investment returns and managers’ vega and delta is no longer significant, although the signs remain
consistent with those in Table 7. Thus, it is possible that the relations between lower-risk
investments and managers’ incentive compensation structures described in previous sections
reflect different types of managers selecting into certain types of firms and compensation
structures. Alternatively, the lack of significance for lower-risk investment returns may reflect the
loss of statistical power from including manager fixed effects in the specification.
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8.3. Four-factor expected returns model
In previous sections, I compute risk and return relations using firms’ market-adjusted stock
returns to measure their abnormal returns during the year. In this section, I instead estimate these
abnormal returns using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Specifically, I estimate firms’ four-factor
alphas based on daily stock returns during the year and recompute my risk and return measures
described in Section 3 using these estimated alphas in place of market-adjusted returns. I then reestimate equation 6 using these alternative risk-return measures.
Table 15 reports the results from this analysis based on four-factor alphas. I continue to
find that firms provide managers with more vega when the risk-return relation is more positive and
that they provide more delta when lower-risk investments have greater returns. In general, these
results are very similar to those in Table 7, both in significance and magnitude. Thus, my results
do not appear to depend on any particular specification of expected stock returns. 34

9. Conclusion
Agency theory posits that managerial risk aversion imposes agency costs on shareholders
and that one of the primary purposes of incentive compensation is to help mitigate these agency
costs. These risk-related agency costs arise from the assumption that the firm’s risk and return are
positively correlated, and risk-averse managers may “underinvest” in risk to the detriment of
shareholders. This suggests that firms with stronger risk-return relations should provide more risktaking incentives, as the benefits of providing them (or the costs of not doing so) are larger.
In this paper, I examine how the relation between the risk of and return on a firm’s
investments influences its managerial incentive compensation choices. I first evaluate whether, or
for which firms, riskier investments seem to generate greater expected returns for shareholders. I
then examine if firms appear to design managers’ compensation contracts accordingly. In
particular, I expect firms to provide managers with the most risk-taking incentives when the benefits

34

I also obtain very similar results if I estimate expected returns using a three-factor Fama-French (1993)
model (untabulated).
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from increased risk-taking are greatest (i.e., when riskier investments generate the greatest
incremental returns).
I find that, on average, investment value increases with risk, suggesting that shareholders
benefit when managers increase risky investment. I also find that firms provide managers with more
risk-taking incentives as the incremental returns to risky investment, and therefore the potential
benefits from risk-taking, increase. Likewise, I find that firms tend to provide fewer risk-taking
incentives when the returns to lower-risk investment are higher. Overall, my results are consistent
with risk-taking incentives primarily mitigating risk-related agency costs, rather than resulting in
widespread “excessive” risk-taking.
In addition, I find that managers appear to take on more risk when incremental returns to
riskier investment are larger, even after controlling for standard measures of equity incentives. This
suggests that understanding managers’ total risk-taking incentives requires considering not only
their equity compensation, but also the risk-return relations within their firms. For example,
managers at firms where riskier investment generates very large expected returns relative to less
risky investment may have significant incentives to increase risk even in the absence of any
meaningful equity-based incentive compensation.
My findings provide one potential explanation for the conflicting results in prior literature on
the relation between managers’ stock price exposure (i.e., delta) and risk-taking. Managers’ overall
risk-taking incentives from delta are a combination of “wealth” effects, from greater risk-taking
potentially increasing managers’ expected compensation, and “risk-aversion” effects, from greater
risk-taking potentially increasing the variance of managers’ compensation. Because the magnitude
of these “wealth” effects depends on the risk-return tradeoffs that managers face, understanding
these tradeoffs is an important element in evaluating the overall incentive consequences of
managers’ equity-based compensation.
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions
Dependent variables
Delta

Log of 1 plus the sensitivity of manager wealth to a one
percent change in the firm’s stock price

Vega

Log of 1 plus the sensitivity of manager wealth to a one
percentage point change in the firm’s stock volatility

Capex

Capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets

R&D

R&D expense scaled by lagged total assets

Risk-return variables
Total investment value

Residual from industry-year regression of abnormal return on
unexpected earnings, as defined below

Per-dollar investment value

Total investment value scaled by unexpected investment, as
defined below
Residual from industry-year regression of change in stock
volatility on stock return and change in leverage

Total investment risk
Per-dollar investment risk
Return-risk tradeoff
Lower-risk return

Total investment risk scaled by unexpected investment, as
defined below
Coefficient from industry-year regression of per-dollar
investment value on per-dollar investment risk
Intercept from industry-year regression of per-dollar
investment value on per-dollar investment risk

Other variables
Abnormal return

Market-adjusted stock return during the year

Investment

Capital expenditures plus R&D expense plus acquisitions less
sales of PP&E and depreciation, scaled by lagged market
capitalization
Residual from industry-year regression of investment on cash
flow, lagged sales growth, and lagged investment

Unexpected investment
Unexpected earnings

Size
Book-to-market
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock volatility
Cash flow

Change in income before extraordinary items plus
depreciation and R&D expense from the prior year, scaled by
lagged market capitalization
Log of market capitalization
Book value of total assets divided by total debt plus market
value of equity
Long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus market value of
equity
Percentage change in sales from the prior year
Annualized standard deviation of daily stock return over the
prior year
Cash flow from operations plus R&D expense, scaled by
lagged market capitalization
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Appendix B – Total and Per-Dollar Investment Risk and Return
Suppose the firm consists of a set of projects with uncertain cash flows 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. The total
cash flows of the firm are the sum of these individual cash flows from each project:
𝑛

𝐶𝐹 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

The value of the firm is the expectation of these cash flows and the risk of the firm is the variance
of these cash flows:
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐸[𝐶𝐹]
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝐶𝐹]
Thus, project selection potentially influences both the value and the risk of the firm. If projects have
positive expected cash flows, the risk-return relation may be positive at the firm level even if it is
flat or negative per-dollar. Below, I provide some illustrative examples where the firm’s potential
investments (i.e., its investment opportunity set) consist of three projects, and the firm can invest
in one, two, or all three of these projects (i.e., they are not mutually exclusive). For simplicity, I
assume the following:35
1) The projects have uncorrelated cash flows, so 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝐶𝐹] = ∑𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑥𝑖 ].
2) Firms invest in projects in order of increasing risk (i.e., the three project selection
permutations that I depict are: a) only the least risky project, b) only the two least risky
projects, and c) all three projects).
3) All potential projects require the same amount of investment (i.e., the investment sets
depicted are per-dollar).
Case 1 (homogeneous projects): Suppose the investment opportunity set consists of three projects,
each with risk of 1 unit and expected return (cash flow) of 1 unit. Thus, the opportunity set is a point.
This corresponds to potential firm-level (risk, expected cash flow) pairs of (1, 1), (2, 2), and (3, 3),
as illustrated below. In this example, there is a positive, linear firm-level (total) risk-return relation
but no per-dollar relation. In other words, the firm can increase both risk and return by increasing
the scale of investment, but not by investing in riskier projects.
Investment Opportunity Set

Value

Value

Investment Value and Risk

Risk

Risk
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Relaxing assumption 1 to allow for positive (negative) correlations between project cash flows will concavify
(convexify) the firm-level relations depicted, and relaxing assumption 2 to allow for alternative permutations
may reduce the “smoothness” of the relation between risk and return but will not affect the overall sign.
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Case 2 (zero per-dollar risk-return relation): Potential risk-return project pairs are (1, 1), (2, 1), and
(3, 1). This implies there is no risk-return tradeoff at the per-dollar level. However, there is still a
positive relation at the firm level (in this case, it is concave). Again, the firm can increase both risk
and return by investing in more projects but not by investing in riskier projects.
Investment Opportunity Set

Value

Value

Investment Value and Risk

Risk

Risk

Case 3 (positive per-dollar risk-return relation): Potential risk-return project pairs are (1, 1), (2, 2),
and (3, 3). In this case, there is a positive and linear risk-return tradeoff at the per-dollar level. This
again corresponds to a positive firm-level relation. Here, the firm can increase risk and return either
by investing in more projects or by investing in riskier projects. As in case 1, the firm-level relation
is positive and linear, which suggests that the firm-level relation is not fully informative about the
per-dollar relation.
Investment Opportunity Set

Value

Value

Investment Value and Risk

Risk

Risk
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Case 4 (negative per-dollar risk-return relation): Finally, suppose potential risk-return project pairs
are (1, 1), (2, 0.75), and (3, 0.5). This is a negative per-dollar risk-return relation. The corresponding
firm-level relation is still positive (and concave). Thus, in this case, increased risk-taking would be
beneficial if it stems from the firm increasing the total amount of risky investment, but detrimental if
it stems from the firm switching to riskier investments.
Investment Opportunity Set

Value

Value

Investment Value and Risk

Risk

Risk
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Figure 1. Investment Value and Risk
This figure illustrates the estimated relation between investment value and investment risk based
on the method described in Section 3.1. The solid line represents a linear approximation of the
relation and the dashed line represents a quadratic approximation.

Investment value

Investment Value and Risk

Investment risk
Linear Approximation

Quadratic Approximation
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Figure 2. Per-Dollar Investment Value and Risk
This figure illustrates the estimated relation between per-dollar investment value and investment
risk based on the method described in Section 3.1. The solid line represents a linear approximation
of the relation and the dashed line represents a quadratic approximation.

Investment value

Per-Dollar Investment Value and Risk

Investment risk
Linear Approximation

Quadratic Approximation
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the primary variables used in my tests. Panel A reports
statistics for the sample with which I estimate risk-return tradeoffs and Panel B reports statistics for
the sample with which I estimate the relation between risk-return tradeoffs and incentive
compensation. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel A: Risk-return relation sample
Variable

n

Mean

S.D.

25th

Median

75th

Abnormal return

83,211

0.03

0.66

-0.37

-0.08

0.24

Investment

83,211

0.06

0.12

0.00

0.04

0.10

Unexpected earnings

83,211

0.02

0.27

-0.04

0.01

0.04

Size

83,211

5.11

2.25

3.48

5.03

6.65

Book-to-market

83,211

0.98

0.61

0.54

0.88

1.26

Leverage

83,211

0.19

0.23

0.00

0.10

0.30

Sales growth

83,211

0.13

0.29

-0.03

0.08

0.23

Stock volatility

83,211

0.65

0.43

0.37

0.55

0.80

Cash flow

83,211

0.12

0.16

0.03

0.10

0.19

n

Mean

S.D.

25th

Median

75th

Abnormal return

38,702

0.09

0.62

-0.27

-0.02

0.27

Investment

38,702

0.06

0.11

0.00

0.04

0.09

Unexpected earnings

38,702

0.02

0.23

-0.02

0.01

0.03

Size

38,702

6.53

1.84

5.33

6.46

7.68

Book-to-market

38,702

0.87

0.54

0.49

0.77

1.12

Leverage

38,702

0.17

0.21

0.00

0.10

0.27

Sales growth

38,702

0.13

0.28

-0.01

0.08

0.22

Stock volatility

38,702

0.53

0.30

0.33

0.46

0.65

Cash flow

38,702

0.12

0.13

0.05

0.10

0.17

Delta

38,702

5.01

1.75

3.97

5.06

6.11

Vega

38,702

3.09

1.77

1.91

3.23

4.35

Panel B: Incentive compensation sample
Variable
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Table 2. Investment Risk and Types of Investment
This table reports results from regressing investment risk as described in Section 3.1 on R&D and
capital expenditures. Control variables are lagged one period from the dependent variable.
Industry-year fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors
clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.

R&D
Capex

(1)
Total investment
risk

(2)
Total investment
risk

(3)
Per-dollar investment
risk

(4)
Per-dollar investment
risk

0.095***

0.242***

0.760***

2.457***

(5.13)

(10.50)

(3.37)

(8.49)

-0.009

0.045***

-0.057

0.535***

(-0.56)

(2.60)

(-0.31)

(2.69)

Size

-0.027***
(-7.46)

(-7.41)

Book-tomarket

0.031***

0.295***

(6.92)

(5.11)

Leverage

0.045***

0.575***

(4.41)

(4.56)

Sales growth

-0.247***

-2.909***

(-6.75)

(-6.80)

-0.010*

-0.108

Stock
volatility
Cash flow

-0.325***

(-1.79)

(-1.32)

-0.146***

-1.610***

(-9.88)

(-8.49)

Observations

20,956

20,068

20,956

20,068

R-squared

0.036

0.167

0.036

0.131
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Table 3. Investment Value and Future Sales Growth
This table reports results from regressing investment value as described in Section 3.1 on future
sales growth. Control variables are lagged one period from the dependent variable. Industry-year
fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm,
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1)
Total investment
value

(2)
Total investment
value

(3)
Per-dollar investment
value

(4)
Per-dollar investment
value

Sales
growtht+1

0.405***

0.443***

4.460***

4.863***

(16.26)

(17.23)

(13.75)

(14.35)

Sales
growtht+2

0.159***

0.163***

2.002***

2.083***

(5.66)

(5.66)

(5.33)

(5.36)

Sales
growtht+3

0.079***

0.105***

0.627*

0.890**

(3.03)

(3.92)

(1.87)

(2.55)

Size
Book-tomarket
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock
volatility
Cash flow

-0.027***

-0.212***

(-6.65)

(-3.83)

0.111***

1.078***

(7.15)

(4.84)

-0.022

-0.639

(-0.61)

(-1.42)

0.104***

0.589*

(3.59)

(1.79)

-0.008

0.036

(-0.34)

(0.12)

0.335***

3.379***

(7.11)

(5.53)

Observations

14,409

13,689

14,409

13,689

R-squared

0.093

0.123

0.079

0.091
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Table 4. Investment Value and Risk
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡2
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 is investment value and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is investment risk, as described in Section 3.1. Industryyear fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by
firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

Investment
risk

(1)
Total investment
value

(2)
Total investment
value

(3)
Per-dollar investment
value

(4)
Per-dollar investment
value

0.397***

0.387***

0.346***

0.353***

(13.30)

(13.73)

(9.44)

(9.94)

Investment
risk2

0.099

-0.011***

(1.55)

(-2.96)

Observations

20,956

20,956

20,956

20,956

R-squared

0.058

0.058

0.053

0.055
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Table 5. Risk-Return Tradeoffs by Industry
This table presents the industries with the largest and smallest average risk-return tradeoffs across
the sample.
Rank

Industry

1

Apparel

2

Construction

3

Personal Services

4

Machinery

5

Computers

6

Steel

7

Rubber

8

Wholesale

9

Entertainment

10

Business Supplies

11

Restaurants and Hotels

12

Chemicals

13

Transportation

14

Electronic Equipment

15

Autos and Trucks

16

Retail

17

Healthcare

18

Toys

19

Medical Equipment

20

Electrical Equipment

21

Business Services

22

Pharmaceuticals

23

Food Products

24

Communication

25

Construction Materials

26

Oil

27

Textiles

28

Measuring and Control Equipment

29

Consumer Goods

30

Fabricated Products

31

Printing And Publishing

(most positive)

(most negative)
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Table 6. Risk-Return Tradeoffs and Industry Characteristics
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝐻𝐻𝐼, and 𝐵𝑇𝑀 are the industry-year risk-return tradeoff, Herfindahl index, and
average book-to-market ratio, respectively. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. tstatistics, based on standard errors clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1)
Risk-return
tradeoff
Herfindahl index

(2)
Risk-return
tradeoff

-1.550*

-1.582**

(-1.93)

(-2.43)

Book-to-market

Observations
R-squared

(3)
Risk-return
tradeoff

0.539**

0.546**

(2.63)

(2.69)

583

583

583

0.054

0.057

0.062
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Table 7. Risk-Return Tradeoffs and Incentive Compensation
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜅2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 (i.e., the slope and intercept), respectively,
from industry-year estimations of equation 3. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not
reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.
(1)

(2)

Vega

Delta

0.025***

-0.000

(4.19)

(-0.06)

-0.015***

0.013***

(-3.12)

(2.81)

0.600***

0.550***

(42.70)

(43.59)

0.215***

-0.416***

(6.70)

(-12.41)

0.522***

-0.307***

(6.36)

(-3.63)

-0.203***

0.430***

(-5.94)

(12.84)

-0.570***

-0.157***

(-9.71)

(-3.03)

0.306***

0.314***

(3.59)

(3.84)

Observations

33,139

33,139

R-squared

0.413

0.437

Return-risk tradeoff
Lower-risk return
Size
Book-to-market
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock volatility
Cash flow
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Table 8. Risk-Return Tradeoffs, Incentive Compensation, and Systematic vs. Idiosyncratic
Risk
This table reports results from estimating the following model, after separating risk into systematic
and idiosyncratic components as described in Section 5:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜅2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 (i.e., the slope and intercept), respectively,
from industry-year estimations of equation 3. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not
reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.

Syst. return-risk tradeoff

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Vega

Vega

Vega

Delta

Delta

Delta

-0.003

0.001

(-1.13)

(0.18)

-0.002
(-0.86)

Idio. return-risk tradeoff

0.001
(0.16)

0.021***

0.021***

0.001

0.001

(3.43)

(3.50)

(0.20)

(0.19)

-0.015***

-0.015***

0.013***

0.013***

Lower-risk return

-0.013***
(-2.75)

(-3.06)

(-2.98)

(2.79)

(2.79)

(2.78)

Size

0.599***

0.600***

0.600***

0.550***

0.550***

0.550***

(42.67)

(42.69)

(42.68)

(43.59)

(43.60)

(43.58)

Book-to-market

0.215***

0.215***

0.215***

-0.416***

-0.416***

-0.416***

(6.69)

(6.70)

(6.69)

(-12.41)

(-12.41)

(-12.41)

Leverage

0.525***

0.522***

0.523***

-0.307***

-0.307***

-0.307***

(6.41)

(6.37)

(6.38)

(-3.64)

(-3.64)

(-3.63)

Sales growth

-0.204***

-0.203***

-0.203***

0.430***

0.430***

0.430***

(-5.97)

(-5.95)

(-5.96)

(12.84)

(12.84)

(12.84)

Stock volatility

-0.574***

-0.571***

-0.570***

-0.157***

-0.157***

-0.157***

(-9.78)

(-9.72)

(-9.72)

(-3.03)

(-3.03)

(-3.03)

0.309***

0.307***

0.307***

0.314***

0.314***

0.314***

(3.63)

(3.60)

(3.60)

(3.84)

(3.83)

(3.84)

Observations

33,139

33,139

33,139

33,139

33,139

33,139

R-squared

0.412

0.413

0.413

0.437

0.437

0.437

Cash flow
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0.013***

Table 9. CEO Risk Aversion
This table reports results from estimating the following model across subsamples of CEOs with
relatively low and relatively high risk aversion:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the firm’s risk-return tradeoff. Low and high risk aversion represent top- and
bottom-tercile CEO experienced returns as described by Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Industry
and year fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered
by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

Risk aversion:
Return-risk tradeoff
Lower-risk return
Size
Book-to-market
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock volatility
Cash flow

(1)

(2)

Vega

Vega

Low

High

0.010

0.031***

(0.93)

(2.60)

-0.025***

-0.004

(-2.68)

(-0.41)

0.612***

0.585***

(31.08)

(25.30)

0.348***

0.147***

(7.36)

(3.49)

0.512***

0.586***

(4.27)

(5.04)

-0.241***

-0.153***

(-4.11)

(-2.90)

-0.523***

-0.708***

(-6.02)

(-7.14)

0.456***

0.252**

(3.48)

(2.03)

Pr(Low = High)

0.234

Observations

10,681

10,868

R-squared

0.407

0.419
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Table 10. Investment Risk and Risk-Return Tradeoffs
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is either capital expenditures or R&D expense, scaled by lagged total assets,
and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 (i.e., the slope and intercept), respectively,
from industry-year estimations of equation 3. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not
reported. Delta and Vega are lagged one period from the dependent variable and all other controls
are measured contemporaneously. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1)

(2)

Capex (x100)

R&D (x100)

Return-risk tradeoff

-0.055*

0.083***

(-1.71)

(3.07)

Lower-risk return

0.059***

-0.061**

(2.78)

(-2.14)

Delta

0.415***

-0.118**

(8.09)

(-2.03)

Vega

-0.320***

0.456***

(-6.01)

(7.12)

-0.073

-0.677***

Size

(-1.07)

(-8.12)

-1.553***

-3.519***

(-11.49)

(-17.04)

Leverage

-1.154***

-5.553***

(-2.65)

(-13.75)

Sales growth

4.446***

2.524***

(17.63)

(8.67)

Stock volatility

0.527**

8.426***

(2.21)

(19.02)

Cash flow

5.082***

6.636***

(8.70)

(10.18)

Observations

30,798

30,798

R-squared

0.354

0.494

Book-to-market
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Table 11. Investment Risk, Risk-Return Tradeoffs, and Incentive Compensation
This table reports results from estimating the following model across subsamples with low and high
risk-return tradeoffs:
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is either capital expenditures or R&D expense, scaled by lagged total assets,
and 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 is the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to a one percent change in the firm’s stock
price. The high risk-return tradeoff sample consists of observations where the estimated risk-return
tradeoff is significantly positive (at 10%) and the low risk-return tradeoff sample consists of all other
observations. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not reported. Delta and Vega are
lagged one period from the dependent variable and all other controls are measured
contemporaneously. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.

Return-risk tradeoff:
Delta
Vega
Size

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Capex (x100)

Capex (x100)

R&D (x100)

R&D (x100)

Low

High

Low

High

0.424***

0.392***

-0.167***

-0.007

(7.70)

(6.17)

(-2.78)

(-0.10)

-0.308***

-0.345***

0.462***

0.426***

(-5.41)

(-5.33)

(7.07)

(5.65)

-0.079

-0.063

-0.619***

-0.800***

(-1.09)

(-0.79)

(-7.25)

(-7.83)

-1.551***

-1.615***

-3.527***

-3.457***

(-10.84)

(-9.20)

(-16.23)

(-13.74)

Leverage

-1.389***

-0.560

-5.650***

-5.273***

(-2.99)

(-1.01)

(-13.04)

(-10.45)

Sales growth

4.357***

4.484***

2.549***

2.502***

(15.79)

(12.37)

(7.40)

(5.23)

Stock volatility

0.569**

0.497

8.831***

7.332***

(2.16)

(1.37)

(18.05)

(10.75)

Cash flow

5.472***

4.102***

6.323***

7.494***

(8.62)

(5.37)

(9.09)

(8.25)

Book-to-market

Pr(DeltaLow = DeltaHigh)

0.577

0.002

Observations

21,318

9,480

21,318

9,480

R-squared

0.358

0.353

0.489

0.510
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Table 12. Lagged Risk-Return Tradeoffs and Incentive Compensation

This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the firm’s risk-return tradeoff. Industry and year fixed effects are included but
not reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Return-risk tradeofft-1

Lower-risk returnt-1

(1)

(2)

Vega

Delta

0.025***

0.008

(4.39)

(1.28)

-0.004

0.006

(-0.82)

(1.25)

0.604***

0.550***

(42.90)

(43.99)

Book-to-market

0.218***

-0.413***

(6.81)

(-12.37)

Leverage

0.522***

-0.309***

(6.40)

(-3.66)

Sales growth

-0.204***

0.430***

(-6.01)

(12.90)

Stock volatility

-0.531***

-0.145***

(-7.76)

(-2.73)

0.331***

0.326***

(3.88)

(3.98)

Observations

33,495

33,495

R-squared

0.414

0.435

Size

Cash flow

52

Table 13. Risk-Return Tradeoffs and Incentive Compensation, Excluding Estimation Firms
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the firm’s risk-return tradeoff. Firms used to estimate these risk-return
tradeoffs are excluded from the sample. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not
reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1)

(2)

Vega

Delta

0.017**

0.003

(2.29)

(0.43)

Lower-risk return

-0.010*

0.012**

(-1.69)

(2.28)

Size

0.600***

0.542***

(38.08)

(39.76)

Book-to-market

0.226***

-0.434***

(6.36)

(-11.50)

Leverage

0.553***

-0.306***

(6.28)

(-3.30)

Sales growth

-0.239***

0.449***

(-5.80)

(11.24)

Stock volatility

-0.587***

-0.145**

(-8.67)

(-2.45)

0.318***

0.271***

(3.38)

(2.98)

Observations

25,688

25,688

R-squared

0.415

0.431

Return-risk tradeoff

Cash flow
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Table 14. CEO Fixed Effects
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜅2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 (i.e., the slope and intercept), respectively,
from industry-year estimations of equation 3. CEO and year fixed effects are included but not
reported. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.

Return-risk tradeoff
Lower-risk return

(1)

(2)

Vega

Delta

0.014***

0.001

(2.71)

(0.16)

-0.005

0.003

(-1.23)

(0.95)

0.397***

0.759***

(13.77)

(36.29)

0.066*

-0.174***

(1.92)

(-6.28)

0.221**

-0.154*

(2.29)

(-1.95)

-0.097***

0.081***

(-3.82)

(3.63)

-0.603***

-0.098***

(-11.00)

(-2.75)

0.174***

0.275***

(2.73)

(4.61)

Observations

33,139

33,139

R-squared

0.868

0.875

Size
Book-to-market
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock volatility
Cash flow
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Table 15. Four-Factor Expected Returns Model
This table reports results from estimating the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜅2 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 𝛿1 and 𝛿0 (i.e., the slope and intercept), respectively,
from industry-year estimations of equation 3. These measures are computed using estimated
alphas from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, rather than the market-adjusted returns described
in Section 3. Industry and year fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics, based on
standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1)

(2)

Vega

Delta

0.018***

0.003

(3.01)

(0.53)

-0.016***

0.011**

(-3.12)

(2.30)

0.600***

0.549***

(42.76)

(43.58)

0.214***

-0.417***

(6.67)

(-12.44)

0.523***

-0.310***

(6.37)

(-3.67)

-0.204***

0.431***

(-5.98)

(12.86)

-0.572***

-0.159***

(-9.74)

(-3.06)

0.309***

0.314***

(3.62)

(3.83)

Observations

33,211

33,211

R-squared

0.413

0.437

Return-risk tradeoff
Lower-risk return
Size
Book-to-market
Leverage
Sales growth
Stock volatility
Cash flow
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